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Active v. Passive 
Euthanasia: Why 
l(eep the Distinction? 
I n the past two decades, we have witnessed a "sea change in pub-lic, medical, and legislative judg-ments" about "letting die" and 
the "right to die." 1 But it is no less true 
today than it was 35 years ago, when I 
first wrote about this subject, that in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence active 
euthanasia (what used to be called 
"mercy killing") is murder. 2 
So far as the law on the books is con-
cerned, it matters not that one who in-
tentionally kills another human being 
"does so at the victim's request" or that 
"his motive is the worthy one of termi-
nating the victim's sufferings from an in-
curable and painful disease."3 As one 
commentator recently explained it, "So 
great a value is put on life that a person 
may not waive his right to life; killing 
does not become nonculpable because 
the victim consented."4 
But all this may change in the near 
future. As one of the nation's most 
forceful and eloquent opponents of ac-
tive euthanasia, the University of Chica-
go's Leon Kass, observed several years 
ago, "So-called active euthanasia prac-
ticed by physicians seems to be an idea 
whose time has come."5 
Not a few would say that Kass exag-
gerated the potency of the assault on the 
long-standing prohibition against "di-
rect" or "active" euthanasia. After all, 
although most forecasters predicted in 
Yale Kamisar is the Clarence Danvw Dis-
tinguished University Professor of Law at the 
University of Michigan. 
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1991 that Washington state would be-
come the first jurisdiction in the West-
ern world to legalize active euthanasia, 
Initiative 119 (euphemistically called the 
"death with dignity" or "aid in dying" 
referendum) went down to defeat. And 
last November, although once again 
early polls indicated overwhelming sup-
port for a similar proposal in California 
(Proposition 161), it, too, failed. 
At first blush, these political setbacks 
for the active euthanasia movement 
seem fairly decisive. But I think not; 
they can be explained away or at least 
minimized. I believe that Kass's con-
cerns are as well founded today as when 
he first voiced them in 1989. 
Jack Kevorkian, the Michigan pathol-
ogist who practices as well as preaches 
assisted suicide, may have significantly 
affected the outcome in Washington. 
Less than two weeks before voters went 
to the polls, Kevorkian used his "sui-
cide" machine twice in one night. From 
that point on, according to a spokesper-
son for the Hemlock Society in Seattle, 
voter support for the "aid-in-dying" 
measure fell dramatically. 6 At the very 
moment Kevorkian swung into action, 
a TV blitz against the measure hit the 
airwaves, and "Jack Kevorkian put a face 
on [people's] fear." 7 
But proponents of assisted suicide and 
active euthanasia have distanced them-
selves from Kevorkian, noting that the 
women whose deaths he assisted were 
not his patients and not terminally ill. 
They point instead to the "aid-in-
dying" performed by Timothy Quill, a 
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Rochester, New York, doctor who is also 
a member of the University of Roches-
ter Medical School faculty. Quill was 
neither indicted nor disciplined by med-
ical authorities for prescribing enough 
barbiturates to enable a long-standing 
patient to commit suicide following her 
refusal of treatment for a severe type of 
leukemia. 8 
The response to Quill's action and to 
the article he wrote in a medical journal 
spelling out what he had done and why 
has been "very positive" and has "moved 
public discussion away from the suicide 
machine." 9 Many who were jolted, or 
at least greatly troubled, by Kevorkian's 
actions supported QuilJ.I 0 
Although last November California 
voters defeated Proposition 161 by a 54 
percent to 46 percent margin, support 
for the measure was impressive-con-
sidering that a coalition oflOO organiza-
tions (including the Roman Catholic 
Church, the California Medical Associa-
tion, and the California Nurses Associa-
tion) fought the proposal, nearly every 
major newspaper in the state editorial-
ized against it, and opponents of the 
proposition outspent proponents by a 
margin of at least 3 to l. 11 
Moreover, opponents ofProposition 
161 did not frontally attack the basic no-
tion embodied in the measure as much 
as they raised fears that it lacked ade-
quate protections. 12 They pointed out 
that 
~ although the initial directive had 
to be witnessed by two people not 
linked financially with the patient, no 
witnesses were mandated at the time of 
the actual request for and implementa-
tion of euthanasia; 
~ although an "enduring request" 
by a qualified patient was required, it 
was simply defined as one "expressed on 
more than one occasion" (perhaps only 
a day or several hours apart); 
~ there was no required "waiting pe-
riod" after a patient decided to seek 
help in dying; and 
~ the proposal did not require a psy-
chiatric evaluation to rule out treatable 
depression as a basis for the request. 13 
Public Acceptance 
Most opponents of Proposition 161 
hammered away at its inadequate safe-
guards rather than its basic idea prob-
ably because they were well aware that 
"the marked increase in public accep-
tance of killing terminally ill patients 
... has been striking." 14 According to 
public opinion polls, not only does a 
large majority of U.S. citizens now sup-
port Jaws allowing terminally ill patients 
to refuse or stop life-sustaining treat-
ment, 15 but many Americans now favor 
Dr. Jack Kevorkian and his 'suicide' machine 
active euthanasia for incurable and coma-
tose patients. 16 
According to a close observer of the 
Proposition 161 contest, "The ranks of 
those voting no swelled as the opposi-
tion coalition focused its advertising 
during the final weeks on what worked 
a year earlier to bring down a similar 
measure in Washington state by a nearly 
identical margin (54-46): voters' fears 
that mistakes would be madc." 17 But 
only six months before Proposition 161 
went down to defeat, surveys showed 
that 75 percent of California voters sup-
ported the basic idea of physician aid-
in-dying, 54 percent strongly so. 18 
Thus, Alexander Morgan Capron, the 
former executive director of the Presi-
dent's Commission for the Study of 
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Be-
havioral Research, now professor oflaw 
and medicine at the University of South-
ern California, had good reason to issue 
the following warning: 
Proposition l6l's defeat should not 
obscure the remarkable fact that mil-
lions of people arc so fearful of how 
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thev think thev'll be treated bv the 
health care svst~m when thev're ven· 
ill that thev;d rather be de;d .... · 
Average p~ople are . . . so dismayed 
at how death occurs in this countn' 
and so distrustful of physicians' abili~· 
or willingness to give them a "good 
death" that they will consider over-
turning thousands of years of medical 
ethics and societal prohibitions to le-
galize direct killing by physicians.'9 
I noted earlier that Leon Kass observed 
recently that active euthanasia appears 
to be "an idea whose time has come."20 
But he was quick to add, "In my view, 
it is a bad idea whose time must not 
come-not no,v, not ever." 21 
I agree. I was pleased when Washing-
ton's Initiative 119 went down to defeat 
in 1991 and when California's Proposi-
tion 161 met a similar fate last vear. 
But proponents of these measu'res arc 
not easily discouraged. They can be ex-
pected to try again (perhaps in Oregon 
or Florida or in Washington a second 
time) with more finely honed versions 
of the measures that failed. And I share 
Professor Capron's concern that unless 
33 
health care providers who oppose active 
euthanasia "change those aspects of the 
system that make a quick death such an 
attractive alternative, support for legaliz-
ing euthanasia is sure to build and even-
tually to prevail."22 
In resisting the active euthanasia move-
ment in the years ahead I shall be aligned 
with, and rooting for, Capron, Kass, 
and such other well-known commenta-
tors and spokespersons as Daniel Cal-
lahan, Arthur Caplan, Albert Jansen, 
John Pickering, and Susan Wolf. 23 But 
the law and politics of euthanasia make 
strange bedfellows. My anti-active-eutha-
nasia confreres are favorably disposed 
toward, or at least willing to accept, 
what used to be called, and I still call, 
passive euthanasia-a practice that has 
gained wide acceptance. But I have al-
ways been greatly troubled by it. 
r have reexamined the earlier writings 
of my "allies" and read their most re-
cent contributions to the literature. 24 
Insofar as they maintain that individual 
acts of "direct" or "positive" or "ac-
tive" euthanasia are fundamentally dif-
ferent from the "passive" or "negative" 
variety-that the former is unacceptable 
or intrinsically immoral while the latter 
is permissible-I find many of their ar-
guments unpersuasive and none of them 
convincing. 
As Dean Guido Calabresi ofYale Law 
School has pointed out, when we have 
to make "tragic choices" -choices that 
confront us when fundamental beliefs 
clash-"we look for solutions which 
seek to cover the difficulty and thereby 
permit us to assert that we are cleaving 
to both beliefS in conflict."25 A good ex-
ample is how we have dealt with death, 
dying, and euthanasia. 
Beliefs in Conflict 
Two sets of beliefs are in conflict. On 
the one hand, we want to respect pa-
tients' wishes, relieve suffering, and put 
an end to excessively burdensome and 
seemingly futile medical treatment. On 
the other hand, we shrink ·from the 
concept of a life not worth living. We 
want to affirm the supreme value of life. 
We want to maintain the salutary prin-
ciple that the law protects all human life, 
no matter how miserable a person ap-
pears or how worthless she happens to 
feel. 
In short, we want it both ways. The 
two sets of beliefs are in conflict, or at 
least in great tension, but somehow we 
cling to both. 26 
We say all human life is inviolate, but 
34 
we do not always mean it. We make 
"quality of life" judgments, but we 
deny it. We practice a kind of euthanasia 
in a soft light, subdued by history, but 
we would rather not examine this prac-
tice in the bright spotlight of utmost 
analytic clarity. 
As I see it, the purpose of the distinc-
tion between "direct killing" and "let-
ting die" is not (as some claim) to sepa-
rate deaths caused by human action 
from those caused by the processes 
of nature. Nor (as others claim) is it to 
separate intrinsically immoral practices 
from permissible ones. Rather, the pur-
pose of the distinction-or at least its 
Many physicians fail to use 
means that are now 
available to relieve 
virtually all pain. 
effect-is to have it both ways. 
For a long time we have had it both 
ways. In the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s-
as the many fuilures to indict, acquittals, 
and suspended sentences attest -when 
"mercy killing" occurred, the law in ac-
tion was "as malleable as the law on the 
books [was] uncompromising."27 
In the 1970s the distinction between 
"extraordinary" (or "heroic") and "or-
dinary" medical treatment proved ser-
viceable. 28 Although the terms are so 
spongy and were used so loosely that 
the distinction is now widely rejected, 
in its time this distinction, too, medi-
ated or obscured the conflict between 
our two sets of beliefS. 
Calling a life-sustaining medical proce-
dure extraordinary was more an expres-
sion of the conclusion that the proce-
dure could ethically be discontinued 
than it was a justification for doing so. 
But the terminology reassured the pub-
lic that "only certain kinds of lifesaving 
measures could be, and would be, ter-
minated; that disconnecting an uncon-
scious patient's respirator in some vague 
way only constitutes a 'slight deviation' 
from our official morality."29 
The extraordinary/ordinary distinction 
has not fared well in the law of death 
and dying. Another distinction, one 
also rooted in Roman Catholic tradi-
tion, has proved to have much greater 
staying power-the distinction between 
killing and letting die. 
Interestingly, an increasing number of 
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those who defend the distinction are so 
determined to keep a chasm between 
the two practices that they insist that 
the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining measures is not passive eu-
thanasia or any other kind of euthana-
sia and that to use the "E" word in 
this· context only causes confusion. 30 
(I would say rather that it causes, and 
ought to cause, concern.) 
But I think one of the leading propo-
nents of euthanasia (both active and 
passive), the renowned British legal 
scholar Glanville Williams, had it right 
when, 20 years ago, he said, 
A toehold for euthanasia is provided 
by the practice ofletting die, or what 
is now called passive euthanasia .... 
If this distinction between an act and 
an omission is thought to be artificial, 
its artificiality is imposed on us by our 
refusal to accord the same moral free-
dom for action as we do for inaction. 
Pending a change of thought, the 
concept of an omission is a useful 
way of freeing us from some of the 
consequences of overrigid moral 
attitudes. 31 
I have no doubt that Alex Capron, 
Daniel Callahan, Leon Kass, and other 
opponents of active euthanasia draw the 
line at letting die as a matter of prin-
ciple. They support the "right to die," 
but strongly resist direct killing. 
Many others, however, have never 
been happy with this distinction. They 
were willing to draw the line between 
letting die and active euthanasia not as 
a matter of principle but only as a mat-
ter of tactics. I count among them the 
two leading euthanasia proponents of 
our time-Glanville Williams and the 
late Joseph Fletcher, the prominent 
medical ethicist. 
For them, the distinction was a ser-
viceable one because it afforded the 
physician and the patient's fumily much 
more room to maneuver than would be 
possible if one had to proceed by lethal 
injection-and it gave the rest of us, or 
most of the rest of us, less cause for 
alarm. But these people were always 
committed to the realization of active 
euthanasia. For them, acceptance of the 
"right to die" was only a partial victory 
-a stopgap measure. 32 
They are no longer content to have 
it both ways. They are not, and never 
were, satisfied with euthanasia in a soft 
light, subdued by history; they also 
want it in a bright spotlight. 
At a euthanasia conference held nearly 
two decades ago, Fletcher maintained 
that there is no real difference between 
letting die and active euthanasia: "A 
deliberate act of omission, when death 
is the goal or purpose or end sought, 
is morally the same [as] a deliberate act 
of commission.' ' 33 He argued that doc-
tors ought to engage in both forms of 
euthanasia. 
Fletcher's views disturbed some who 
attended the conference. Another speak-
er warned that since some do not clearly 
distinguish between active and passive 
euthanasia and "since active euthanasia 
is morally repugnant to so many . . . 
this confusion has led many physicians 
to avoid the use of the very desirable, 
accepted passive form." 34 According to 
this speaker, the distinction between the 
two forms of euthanasia had to be main-
tained "so that physicians will continue 
and in fact increase their use of this age-
old passive form" and "to insure that 
passive euthanasia not be tainted in 
any way by the active euthanasia 
movement." 35 
Fletcher gave this response: ''Though 
the alleged difference between [passive 
and active euthanasia] is not a real one 
ethically or philosophically or theolog-
ically regarded, it is arguably possible to 
separate them for pragmatic reasons of 
prudence and workability."36 
Since that conference was held, doc-
tors have greatly increased their use of 
the "age-old passive form" of euthana-
sia. Negative or passive euthanasia-even 
removal of the feeding tube-is now a 
fait accompli in modern medicine. That 
battle is over. And there is now more 
support for active euthanasia than there 
ever has been-and I fear that that sup-
~ say all human life is 
inviolate~ but we do not 
always mean it. 
port will grow even stronger. 
Fletcher is no longer with us, but his 
allies and his followers are, and they are 
making their presence felt. They no 
longer feel the need to separate active 
euthanasia from the passive variety for 
pragmatic reasons. Passive euthanasia is 
now so well established that people of 
Fletcher's persuasion are no longer con-
cerned that it will be "tainted" by the 
active euthanasia movement. 
Proponents of active euthanasia are in 
a strong position, and they know it. As 
they see it, the time has come to upset 
the compromise between letting die and 
direct killing. The time has come to 
move on to the next stage of euthanasia. 
Compromise Position 
"It is one thing to justify an act; it 
is another to justify a general practice."37 
Thus, those who can imagine individual 
circumstances where active euthanasia 
would be hard to condemn (and I cer-
tainly can) may still oppose legislation 
authorizing the practice. We may do so, 
as Rutgers Law School's Norman Can-
tor has argued, on the ground that 
"such a radical alteration" in the legal 
framework surrounding gravely ill pa-
tients "ought not to be instituted unless 
it is absolutely essential"38-and no such 
showing has been made. 
The reasons laypeoplc most often give 
for supporting active euthanasia are that 
it is inhumane to make patients suffer 
from intractable pain or that it is in-
humane to keep them biologically alive 
when they seem to have "no life to 
live." But many physicians fail to use 
means that are now available to relieve 
virtually all pain.39 And though ad-
vances in medical technology have made 
it possible, as one commentator has put 
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it, to extend existence beyond all "nat-
ural bounds," physicians, patients, and 
fumilies have learned how to resist medi-
cal procedures this commentator calls 
"merely burdensome or degrading 
medical additions to the unhappy end 
of a life."40 
I have been an active participant in 
the euthanasia debate, but I have also 
tried to be an objective observer of 
developments. I am not enamored of 
the distinction many have drawn be-
tween terminating life support and re-
sorting to external death-causing agents, 
but I have to recognize that this dis-
tinction has become an integral part of 
the medicolegal landscape. 
This is not the conclusion I would 
have arrived at, but it seems to be the 
compromise position our society has 
reached in the struggle to preserve as 
many traditional restraints against killing 
as we can consistent with taking a hu-
mane approach toward seriously ill pa-
tients. This is not the way I would have 
liked to resolve the controversy, and I 
very much doubt that it is the way most 
logicians or philosophers would resolve 
it-but it may nevertheless be a prag-
matic and defensible way to do so. D 
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